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RECENT LEGISLATION 
LEGISLATION-FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-MODIFICATION OF JENCKS 
DECISION-Defendant was convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001.1 Dur-
ing the trial, the court denied defendant's motion to order the government 
to produce for defendant's inspection reports submitted by government wit-
nesses to government agents. The reports dealt with the same subject about 
which these witnesses later testified. The court of appeals affirmed the 
decision.2 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held,. 
reversed, one justice dissenting. The government has a privilege to refuse 
to surrender statements made by its prospective witnesses, but it may 
claim the privilege only at the expense of a dismissal of its case against 
the defendant. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
Before examining the scope and effect of the legislative response to 
this decision, it will be helpful to consider the earlier practice in the 
lower federal courts which was condemned by the Supreme Court in the 
Jencks decision. Following the direct testimony of a government witness 
and upon demand of the defense, the government delivered to the court 
for inspection, in camera, pre-trial statements made by the witness to a 
government agent.3 If there were inconsistencies between the witness• 
testimony and the prior statements, the court, having excised non-relevant 
portions, would order the particular document turned over to the defense 
to be used to impeach the credibility of the witness. If the government 
refused, the witness' testimony was stricken from the record.4 In expressly 
disapproving this practice, the Supreme Court in the principal case held 
that: (a) the defense, in order to obtain the reports, need not establish 
any inconsistency between the statement and the direct testimony5 but 
1 Defendant falsely swore that he was not a Communist Party member or affiliated 
with the Communist Party. 
2 Jencks v. United States, (5th Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 540. 
3 United States v. K.rulewitch, (2d Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 76; United States v. Beekman. 
(2d Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 580. The Court had earlier noted this practice with apparent 
approval. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I (1953). See also Goldman v. United States. 
316. U.S. 129 (1942), a case which presented a more appealing claim for relief than 
did the principal case, as the government witness there had admittedly used the reports. 
to refresh his recollection .before the trial. The Court there held (at 132) that "where a 
witness does not use his notes or memoranda in court, a party has no absolute right 
to have them produced and to inspect them" and "a large discretion must .be allowed the 
trial judge." Justice Clark in his dissenting opinion in the principal case felt that 
logically the majority opinion should have expressly overruled United States v. Gold-
man in the interests of proper judicial administration. 
4 Wilson v. United States, (3d Cir. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 390; United States v. Schneider-
man, (S.D. Cal. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 731. 
5 Failure of the defendant to prove inconsistency' was the ground on which the 
government had opposed defendant's motion for the production of the documents and was 
the basis for the affirmance by the court of appeals. See principal case at 666. See also, 
Scanlon v. United States, (1st Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 382. It is immediately apparent that 
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has only to show that the reports "relate to the testimony of the witness"; 
(b) it is only after the defense has seen the reports that the court is to rule 
on questions of relevancy and admissibility; (c) it is the responsibility of 
the government, not the judge, to balance the alternatives of exercising its 
privilege, thus letting the defendant go free, or of releasing to him the 
information contained in the reports; (d) if the government claims its 
privilege, the case will be dismissed. 6 
In response to this decision and to many lower court decisions7 
variously interpreting it, Congress enacted on September 2, 1957, 18 U.S.C. 
§3500, entitled "Demands for production of statements and reports of wit-
nesses." This enactment upholds the basic premise of the Jencks decision, 
that the government must produce for defendant's inspection statements 
made by its own witnesses to government agents, which may aid the defend-
ant in contradicting the witness' direct testimony.8 The government's alter-
native is to claim its privilege, thereby losing the testimony of that witness. 
The legislation also follows the principal case inasmuch as no prior 
foundation of inconsistency between statement and testimony need be 
laid. If the statement relates to the testimony, it is admissible.9 The impact 
of the statute is upon the mechanics by which the defendant is to be 
furnished the necessary statements. It is in this respect that the principal 
case is overruled.10 Upon motion of the defendant and refusal of the 
government to produce the statements, they are to be delivered for in-
spection, in camera, by the trial judge, who will rule upon them concerning 
the relevancy of the matter in question. I£ he finds nothing which relates 
to the witness' direct testimony he will deny the defendant's motion.11 
a defendant would find it virtually impossible to lay such a preliminary foundation 
without prior access to the statement unless, as in Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 
414 (1953), the witness himself brings out the fact in his testimony. 
6 Principal case at 672. 
7 See Simms v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 26 U.S. LAw WEEK 2028; United 
States v. Benson, (S.D. N.Y. 1957) 20 F.R.D. 602; United States v. Grossman, (D.C. N.J. 
1957) 154 F. Supp. 813; United States v. Anderson, (E.D. Mo. 1957) 154 F. Supp. 374; 
United States v. Rosenberg, (3d Cir. 1957) 245 F. (2d) 870; United States v. Hall, (W .D. 
Ky. 1957) 153 F. Supp. 661. See also cases cited 103 CONG. REc. 14552 (August 26, 1957). 
Respondents before administrative agencies had also demanded, and been refused, 
statements of third parties submitted to the government. Great Atlantic and Pacific 
Tea Co., (N.L.R.B. 1957) 26 U.S. LAW WEEK 1035; In re Kosuga, (C.E.A. 1957) 26 
U.S. LAW ·WEEK 2083. 
s P.L. 85-269, 85th Cong. (Sept. 2, 1957), hereinafter cited as 18 U.S.C. §3500 (b} 
and (c). See also 103 CONG. R.Ec. 14551 (August 26, 1957). 
9 18 U.S.C. §3500 (b), (c) and (d). 
10 18 U.S.C. §3500 (c). See also 103 CoNG. REc. 15249 (August 30, 1957). 
11 If the defendant objects to a denial of his motion and is later found guilty, the 
government must preserve the statement and submit it to the appellate court for a 
review of the correctness of the holding of the trial court. See 18 U.S.C. §3500 (c). The pro. 
vision requiring the defendant to object in order to preserve his rights on appeal is 
a meaningless formality since he cannot make an intelligent objection without having 
access to the statement. It is probable that most defendants will object to the with-
holding of any information from them. 
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If it should be relevant, the trial judge will excise any non-pertinent por-
tion and direct the government to deliver the statement to the defendant. 
If the government refuses, the witness' direct testimony will be stricken 
or a mistrial directed.12 In addition, the statute very carefully spells out 
two limitations which were implicit in the facts of the Jencks decision, 
but which have been unheeded in a number of the lower federal 
decisions.13 The first of these emphasizes that the Jencks case decided only 
a narrow issue, that these reports must be given to the defendant in order 
to impeach the credibility of the witness.14 Thus they need be produced 
only after he has testified. Secondly, the statute contains a definition of 
~•statement" as used in the act and limits the documents which the defend-
ant may obtain to those made by the witness in writing, or, if oral, which 
are contemporaneously recorded by the government agent.15 
Doubts were expressed on the floors of both houses of Congress as 
to the constitutionality of the proposed legislation.16 It is doubtful 
that the Jencks case was decided on a constitutional ground or that the 
former practice of the lower courts would be found to be a violation of 
procedural due process. The majority opinion in holding that the defend-
ant must be the first to see the reports states that "Justice requires no 
less."17 If this were intended to mean "due process requires no less,'' 
it is submitted that the Court would have more clearly defined the con-
stitutional basis.18 Viewing the case as a whole, the decision appears to 
12 It is to be noted that this is an important departure from the rule of the Jencks 
case where failure to produce the witness' statement resulted in a dismissal. 353 U.S. 
657 at 672 (1957). See also cases cited 103 CoNG. R.Ec. 14552 (August 26, 1957). In one 
case purporting to follow the Jencks decision, when the government agent declined to 
produce a potential witness' statement in advance of trial, the trial judge refused to 
dismiss ,but, instead, held the agent in contempt. The court stated that "a criminal 
prosecution should be entirely devoid of any possibility of surprise to the defendant 
at the time of the trial." United States v. Hall, note 7 supra, at 663. 
13 E.g., United States v. Rosenberg and United States v. Hall, note 7 supra. 
14 18 U.S.C. §3500 (a). Provision was also made to recess the trial in order to allow 
the defense to read the statements and to make use of them in the trial, 18 U.S.C. 
§3500 (c). 
15 This definition was inserted as a separate paragraph to express the congressional 
intent that reports other than those made by the witness to an agent of the govern-
ment should not come within the scope of the act. It was particularly designed to over-
rule cases wherein the court had ordered entire governmental files, names of prospective 
witnesses and grand jury reports to be given to the defendant. See cases cited 103 CoNG. 
R.Ec. 14552 (August 26, 1957). 
16103 CONG. R.Ec. 15249 (August 30, 1957) and 103 CONG. R.Ec. 14538 (August 26, 1957). 
17 Principal case at 669. See State v. Thompson, (Del. 1957) 134 A. (2d) 266, 
and State v. Williams, (N.J. 1957) 134 A. (2d) 39. 
18 The court cites no cases to indicate that the decision is based on constitutional 
grounds. Instead, the majority opinion speaks of "-the value of the reports for im-
peachment purposes" and of "our standards for the administration of criminal jus-
tice in the federal courts." The concurring opinion likewise alludes to "administra-
tion of criminal justice in the federal courts," while the dissent refers to the majority 
as "fashion [ing] a new rule of evidence." 
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represent only the exercise of authority by the Supreme Court over the 
procedure to be observed in the lower federal courts. 
Congressional discussions emphasize that the enactment was not intend-
ed in any way to modify or affect the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.19 
It was felt that since the Jencks opinion did not make reference to the rules 
and since the legislation was intended to affect only the decision of the 
Jencks case, the legislation must likewise avoid disturbance of the rules. 
Whether the policy of the legislation and that of the rules can be 
reconciled in every case is questionable, however. The recent legislation 
is emphatic in providing that the defendant may order a witness' prior 
statement produced only after the witness has testified;20 yet, in a 1953 
decision, Fryer v. United States,21 the District of Columbia Circuit seized on 
language of a Supreme Court case, Bowman Dairy v. United States,22 
to hold that under the subpoena provisions of federal rule 17(c) a defend-
ant might obtain a statement of a prospective government witness in 
advance of trial. The language of the rule23 and the interpretation of 
it by the Supreme Court in the Bowman case are such that it would be 
quite logical for a court to permit pre-trial discovery under rule 17(c) 
of possible impeaching documents,24 despite the new legislation which 
19 103 CoNG. R.Ec. 14534 and 14537 (August 26, 1957) and 14727 to 14730 (August 
27, 1957). See also 103 CONG. R.Ec. 15249 (August 30, 1957). 
20 18 U.S.C. §3500 (a). 
21 Fryer v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 134. It is perhaps unwise to 
project the holding of this case upon the subject generally. It involved a capital case 
and, under a federal statute, the defendant was provided with a list of the government 
witnesses to be called. Thus, the case is distinguishable from the problem now under 
consideration wherein it is uncertain which witnesses the government will call, so 
that a pre-trial inspection would very likely ,be deemed a "fishing expedition." See 
Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953). 
22 Bowman Dairy v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951), had stated (at 220-221) 
that "the plain words of the Rule [17(c)J are not to be ignored. They must be given 
their ordinary meaning to carry out the purpose of establishing a more liberal policy 
for the production, inspection and use of materials at the trial. There was no inten-
tion to exclude from the reach of process of the defendant any material that had been 
used before the grand jury or could be used at the trial. In short, any document or 
other materials, admissible as evidence, obtained ,by the government by solicitation or 
voluntarily from third persons is subject to subpoena." 
23 "The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in 
the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the 
time when they are to be offered in evidence. . . ." For a discussion of the effects of 
this rule together with rule 16, see 67 HARV. L. R.Ev. 492 (1954). 
24 It should be noted that the Fryer decision apparently stands alone on this 
interpretation of rule 17(c). It did, however, figure prominently in the discussion of 
the effects of the legislation in question on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
See 103 CoNG. R.Ec. 14533 and 14537 to 14541 (August 26, 1957). The case has also been dis-
tinguished in a carefully written opinion by Judge Holtzoff, a member of the Advisory 
Committee which drafted the rules, on the ground that Fryer was a case involving a 
capital offense and, thus, the defense knew which witnesses would be called. The Bow-
man case requires that the statements subpoenaed be such as could be used as evidence 
in the trial. This would include use as impeaching evidence, but Judge Holtzoff would 
require that it be certain that the subpoenaed evidence could be so used and this 
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clearly was passed to avoid such a result. It is only the weight of lower 
· court opinions restricting the sweep of rule 17(c)23 and implications to 
be drawn from the recent legislation that would militate against such an 
interpretation.26 
In summary, the recently enacted legislation restores by statutory 
authority the practice previously followed in the lower federal courts. In 
so doing, it gives legislative approval to the concurring opinion in the 
Jencks case.27 The result is to strike a balance between the demands and 
necessities of the defendant to have at his disposal all that he can to 
aid in his defense and the interests of the government to protect the 
sources of its information and to retain the private character of confi-
dential documents.28 
Raymond J. Dittrich, Jr., S. Ed. 
could not be ascertained unless (a) the defense knew, as in a capital case, which wit-
nesses the government would call, or (b) the witness had already testified. See United 
States v. Carter, (D.C. D.C. 1954) 15 F.R.D. 367. See also United States v. Malizia, (S.D. 
N.Y. 1957) 154 F. Supp. 511. 
25 See United States v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Assn., (D.C. D.C. 
1949) 9 F.R.D. 509; United States v. Iozia, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 13 F.R.D. 335; United States 
v. Carter, note 24 supra; United States v. Schneiderman, (S.D. Cal. 1952) 104 F. Supp. 
405. These opinions hold that rule 17(c) does not provide an additional discovery 
device but is intended only to expedite the trial by giving defendant certain limited 
materials in advance of trial. 
26 The effects of the legislation on this question are uncertain. It might be inter-
preted to be the clear congressional intent to forbid pre-trial discovery in a case which 
involves a situation similar to that of the Jencks case. On the other hand, a court 
could reason that it was the equally clear congressional purpose to refrain from 
modifying the rules, that the Fryer case was decided by interpretation of the rules; 
hence, that the legislation does not preclude another such decision under the rules. 
That this was the fear of the sponsors of the Administration-proposed amendment to 
the bill seems clear. See 103 CONG. REc. 14533 (August 26, 1957). At least one case 
has interpreted the legislation. In United States v. Malizia, (S,D. N.Y. 1957) 154 F. Supp. 
511, the defendant demanded a pre-trial inspection of his own statements volun-
teered to the government. The court denied his motion, pointing out that Congress 
had excepted statements made by the defendant rrom the sweep of the statute, and that 
the ultimate decision was still within the discretion of the trial judge. The court was 
not certain why Congress had withheld such statements from defendants but felt 
that Congress had not considered them "as imbued with the same consequences as 
attach to statements made by third parties." 
27 ,Principal case at 672. 
28 See generally 8 W1c1110RE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., pp. 117-118 and 788-801 (1940) for 
the policy behind governmental privilege as to confidential statements and the func-
tion of the trial court in adjusting the rights and interests of the parties. Cf Haydock, 
"Some Evidentiary Proble1ns Posed by Atomic Energy Security Requirements," 61 HARV. 
L. REv. 468 (1948). See also Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 
